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Deregulation or Re-Regulation? Policymaking in the 
European Community since the Single Act
Giandomenico Majone
European University Institute, Florence
1. introduction: Placing the Single Act in Context 
In the history of the European Community the second half of 
the decade of the 1980s is an extraordinary period of 
policy innovation and institutional activism, in sharp 
contrast with the decline of the 1970s but also 
qualitatively different from the dynamism of the 1960s. The 
great achievement of the sixties was the progress made in 
establishing the customs union, both internally and 
externally. The last remaining custom duties between the 
six founding member states were abolished, ahead of 
schedule, in 1968. However, this progress m  negative 
integration was not matched by a corresponding forward 
movement in positive integration. With exception of 
agriculture and trade, little progress was made either in 
the development of the common policies called for by the 
Paris and Rome Treaties —  notably in the fields of 
transport and energy —  or in coordinating the economic and 
social policies of the member states.
The loss of momentum of the seventies may be 
explained, in part, by the joint impact of two severe 
economic crises and of the institutional strains imposed by 
the first enlargement of the Community. Economic recession 
weakened the determination of governments to resist demands 
for protectionist measures by domestic producers. Thus, 
even the process of removing technical barriers to trade 
slowed down considerably. Since 1974, a large number of 
proposals were held up in the Council because of objections
Paper prepared for the research project on "La 





























































































and reservations expressed by the national governments. In 
policy areas like the liberalization of capital movements 
even the "acquis communautaire" seemed threatened when the 
application of some parts of the directives adopted at the 
beginning of the 1960s was suspended in a number of member 
states invoking safeguard clauses (Schmitt von Sydow,
1988) .
The enlargement from six to nine members could only 
increase the "lourdeur" of Community decision making, 
especially in the light of the notorious Luxembourg 
compromise of January 1966. The effect of the compromise 
was that, by tacit agreement, the Council of Ministers 
hardly ever took decisions by majority vote despite the 
fact that the Rome Treaty provides such a procedure on a 
wide range of issues.
However, it would be wrong to assign to the national 
governments sole responsibility for the progressive loss of 
efficiency of Community institutions during this period.
The attempt to achieve an integrated market by harmonising 
thousands of laws and regulations of six, nine, and finally 
twelve countries at various levels of economic development 
and with vastly different legal, administrative and 
cultural traditions, was bound to fail. In order to 
harmonise national legislations under Article 100 of the 
Treaty of Rome, a binding provision must generally already 
exist in at least one member state. As the EC Commission 
noted in 1980 in a communication to the European 
Parliament, "it is not hard to see how cumbersome is a 
procedure that requires Community consensus to solve a 
problem that could be created by one national civil servant 
working with two or three experts" (Commission of the 
Economic Communities, 1980:5).
According to the same document, "it has never been the 
Commission policy to harmonise for the sake of 
harmonisation". Indeed, the Commission added five years 
later, "a strategy based totally on harmonisation would be 




























































































be inflexible and could stifle innovation" (Commission of 
the European Community, 1985:18). But this was precisely 
the strategy followed, with few notable exceptions, for 
nearly two decades. As Lord Cockfield once put it, in those 
years the Commission seemed to operate according to the 
rule: if it moves, harmonise it!
In short, the impasse reached at the end of the 1970s
was due not only to external causes like economic crisis
and the consequent revival of protectionism, but also, and
more seriously, to basic flaws in the prevailing mode of 
/Community policymaking and in the very philosophy of 
integration. These are the flaws which the Commission's 
White Paper on Completing the Internal Market (COM{85) 310 
final) and the Single European Act (SEA) attempted to 
correct. While it is still too early to determine whether 
the corrections were sufficient to ensure the ultimate 
success of the enterprise, there is no doubt that the two 
documents introduced major conceptual and policy 
innovations. However, as the title of this paper suggests, 
the nature of these innovations is somewhat ambiguous. At 
one level, the internal market programme could be seen as a 
huge exercise in deregulation, its primary purpose being 
the opening up of previously protected markets and the 
removal of barriers to trade and free competition within 
the Community. But a closer examination of the programme 
reveals that although the language is borrowed from 
neoliberalism, the actual proposals often involve a high 
degree of regulation in terms of harmonization of basic 
standards. On balance, I shall argue, the 1992 programme is 
less an exercise in deregulation than in regulatory reform.
2. Policy innovation in the European Community: the 
Commission's White Paper
As soon as Jacques Delors was nominated for the presidency 
of the EC Commission, he began searching for an idea, a 




























































































process of European integration. He considered several 
possibilities —  monetary union, increased cooperation in 
foreign and defense matters, institutional reform —  but 
after a tour of European capitals he reached the conclusion 
that completion of the internal market was the most 
promising programme for "relaunching" the Community.
To understand how this choice was made and how the 
Commission's White Paper eventually became one of the 
turning points in the history of the EC, we need to 
consider in general terms the relationship between 
conceptual innovation and policy development (Majone, 1989: 
161-166).
The capacity of policymakers to respond to incessant 
change in economic conditions, political climate, and 
societal values depends crucially on the availability of a 
rich pool of ideas and proposals. The existing stock of 
ideas shapes the policymakers' response to events by 
defining the conceptual alternatives from among which they 
can choose. On what conditions will the production of new 
ideas be intense or slow, or more intense in one policy 
area than in another? Why are some proposals accepted while 
others are rejected or ignored? More generally, how is 
conceptual innovation linked to policy development?
To pose such questions is to suggest that policy 
development may be analyzed as the outcome of a dual 
process of conceptual innovation and of selection by 
political actors from the pool of available policy ideas. 
The locus of conceptual innovation will be .called the 
policy community, while the political arena is the locus of 
selection.
A policy community is composed of specialists who 
share an active interest in a certain policy or set of 
related policies: academics, bureaucratic and interest- 
group experts, consultants, policy planners, opinion makers 
and, in some contexts, even judges. The members of a policy 
community represent different interests, hold different 




























































































all contribute to policy development by generating and 
debating new ideas and proposals. Note that although some 
members of the policy community may also be political 
actors, the two roles are distinct. A voter choosing in a 
referendum or a policymaker choosing among different 
options does not contribute to conceptual innovation; 
rather he or she acts as a mechanism for selecting from the 
pool of available variants. The whole political system, in 
fact, may be thought of as a large selection mechanism that 
picks out for acceptance those of the competing policy 
ideas that in some sense best meet the demands of the 
political environment.
The effectiveness of the selection procedure will 
depend on the rate and quality of conceptual innovation. 
Without a continuous stream of new proposals selection will 
have nothing to work on. Hence, the policy community must 
be sufficiently open and competitive so that truly novel 
variants may emerge. At the same time, selection can be 
effective only where the community is not too open. If each 
and every proposal were taken seriously, the burden for the 
selection mechanisms would soon become unbearable, leading 
to a breakdown of evaluative criteria. To avoid this, 
policy communities rely on various criteria to screen ideas 
that deserve further consideration. The final selection by 
political actors will usually be made from among the 
proposals that survive the screening. The most important 
screening criteria are: technical and economic feasibility, 
administrative simplicity, acceptability in the light of 
the values held by members of the policy community itself, 
and receptivity of the proposal by the political decision 
makers (Kingdon, 1984).
Different sources had contributed to the pool of ideas 
available to the new Delors Commission when it took office 
in January 1985: various services of the Commission itself; 
members of the European Parliament such as Altiero 
Spinelli's "Crocodile Group" and the more pragmatic 




























































































times working with Commission officials, like the Thorn- 
Davignon Commission, the Roundtable of European 
Industrialists, and the Union des Confédérations de 
l'Industrie et des Employeurs d'Europe (UNICE).
Many ideas found in the White Paper and in the SEA 
itself can be traced back to proposals advanced by 
particular members of this transnational policy community. 
Thus in 1983 the Kangaroo group launched a public campaign 
for the adoption of a detailed timetable for the abolition 
of all non-tariff barriers within the EC, and in the 
following year the European Parliament adopted a resolution 
on the,internal market based on an in-depth report, Toward 
European Economic Recovery in the 1980s by M.Albert and 
J.Ball. UNICE was a strong advocate of majority voting to 
increase the efficiency of Community decision making. 
Proposals for technology programmes and for European 
technical standards came from the Thorn-Davignon 
Commission, while the "Europe 1990" plan of Wisse Dekker, 
at the time chief executive officer of Philips, became the 
best known business plan for completing the internal market 
(Moravcsik, 1991). Several elements of the White Paper, 
from the idea of a target date to the emphasis on tax 
harmonization and the liberalization of government 
procurement policies, can already be found in Dekker's 
plan.
As already noted, the EC Commission was an early and 
very active participant in the policy debate on market 
integration. Already in 1981 it had presented a 
communication on "the state of the internal market" to the 
European Council, followed by a second communication on 
"relaunching the internal market" in 1982 and by a report 
on the "assessment of the functioning of the internal 
market" in 1983. In that same year a new Internal Market 
Council was created for the purpose of achieving a better 
coordination of activities related to the internal market. 
Experience had shown that the piecemeal approach of the 




























































































of finance, agriculture, health, and so on, according to 
the issue under discussion —  made it difficult to 
synchronize work in order to put together package deals 
acceptable to all the member states (Schmitt von Sydow, 
1988).
A lengthy stage of debate and persuasion is typical of 
most major policy innovations. As John Kingdon notes, 
"debate and persuasion are needed "to soften up" both 
policy communities, which tend to be inertia-bound and 
resistant to major changes, and larger publics, getting 
them used to new ideas and building acceptance for their 
proposals. Then when a short-run opportunity to push their 
[— i.e., policy entrepreneurs'] proposals comes, the way 
has been paved, the most important people softened up. 
Without this preliminary work, a proposal sprung even at a 
propitious time is likely to fall on deaf ears" (Kingdon, 
1984:134).
Insert Table 1 here
Thus, it is not surprising that only one week after he 
took office, President Delors was able to announce to the 
Parliament the new Commission's intention to ask the 
European Council to pledge itself to completion of a fully 
unified internal market by 1992. Because of the work 
already done by the staff of the Commission and by other 
members of the policy community, the programme for 
"Completing the Internal Market" could be presented to the 
heads of government in the form of a white paper already on 
14th June, 1985 and was endorsed by them at Milan on the 
28th and 29th of the same month.
Recall now the selection criteria mentioned above: 
technical and economic feasibility; administrative 
simplicity; value acceptability; and political receptivity. 
The internal market programme satisfied those criteria much 
better than the other proposals that had been discussed, 




























































































common agricultural policy, and economic and monetary 
union. The internal market programme required no additional 
spending from national or Community budgets, and no major 
reform of Community institutions. At the same time, the 
idea of eliminating hundreds of national regulations and 
technical barriers to trade was very attractive to 
influential members of the Commission like Lord Cockfield; 
to multinational companies; to the conservative government 
of Mrs.Thatcher but also to the French, German and Benelux 
governments; and to advocates of privatization and 
deregulation throughout Europe. Finally, the new strategy 
of mutual recognition (see next section) could be presented 
as the logical development of the laissez-faire doctrine 
developed by the European Court of Justice in the famous 
Cassis de Dijon judgement and in a number of related cases.
No other available alternative presented so many 
advantages or managed to skirt so many obstacles and 
potential pitfalls. Radical reform of the common 
agricultural policy did not seem, then as now, politically 
feasible. Budgetary and institutional reform were not 
sufficiently inspiring goals for the relaunching of Europe. 
On the other hand, economic and monetary union was 
certainly an attractive goal especially to the five 
Commissioners who had been ministers of finance in their 
national governments; but its economic and technical 
feasibility was uncertain while member states' fears 
regarding its political and financial impact made it 
difficult to draft a realistic timetable (Schmitt von 
Sydow, 1988).
In retrospect, the alternative finally chosen by 
President Delors appears to have been the only one with a 
sufficiently high probability of success. Careful attention 
to feasibility conditions and the long process of 
"softening up" of elite and public opinion apparently made 
the crucial difference between the prompt approval and 




























































































the uncertainties and delays of the process of ratification 
of the Maastricht Treaty.
3. How dereaulatorv is the White Paper?
The two basic methods proposed by the Commission in order 
to complete the internal market by the target date of 
1992 —  the "new strategy" of mutual recognition of 
national regulations and standards, and the "new approach" 
to harmonization —  are inspired by different regulatory 
philosophies. Hence the possibility of conflicting 
interpretations of the 1992 project. There is, in fact, a 
strong neoliberal flavour in the language used by the 
Commission, echoing the reasoning of the European Court of 
Justice in Cassis de Diion, to justify the principle of 
mutual recognition:
if a product is lawfully manufactured 
and marketed in one Member State, there 
is no reason why it should not be sold 
freely throughout the Community.
Indeed, the objectives of national 
legislation, such as the protection of 
human health and life and of the 
environment, are more often than not 
identical. It follows that the rules 
and controls developed to achieve those 
objectives, although they may take 
different forms, essentially come down 
to the same thing, and so should 
normally be accorded recognition in all 
Member States .. . What is true for 
goods, is also true for services and 
for people. (White Paper, point 58).
It has not escaped the attention of analysts that a 
strategy of mutual recognition of national regulations and 
standards entails competition among regulators. In turn, 
this could create the conditions for "social dumping" and 
"competitive deregulation" as each country attempts to gain 
advantages for its own industry and to attract foreign 
investments by lowering the level of regulatory constraints 
which firms must meet. Certainly, it is argued, it can be 
no coincidence that the warm endorsement of the proposals 




























































































when the ideology of competition and free markets dominated 
the thinking and, to some extent, the policies of 
governments throughout Western Europe.
However, the practical scope of the new strategy is 
immediately restricted: "in principle ... mutual 
recognition could be an effective strategy for bringing 
about a common market in a trading sense" (White Paper, 
point 63, emphasis added). But, the document continues,
while a strategy based purely on mutual 
recognition would remove barriers to 
trade and lead to the creation of a 
genuine common trading market, it might 
well prove inadequate for the purposes 
of the building up of an expanding 
market based on the competitiveness 
which a continental-scale uniform 
market can generate. On the other hand, 
experience has shown that the 
alternative of relying on a strategy 
based totally on harmonization would be 
over-regulatory ... What is needed is a 
strategy that combines the best of both 
approaches but, above all, allows for 
progress to be made more quickly than 
in the past (White Paper, point 64).
Thus, the "new strategy" is not, after all, the strategy 
chosen by the Commission. The White Paper's focus on mutual 
recognition, as one of the drafters of the document admits, 
"is not motivated by ideological or political reasons, but 
by tactical and practical considerations, namely to reduce 
the Council's workload and to obtain rapid results"
(Schmitt von Sydow, 1988: 96). A case of "reculer pour 
mieux sauter"? "Indeed, harmonization is not dead and may 
sooner or later start to flourish again. It has been 
relegated only in the specific context of the White Paper 
and its ̂ objective of abolishing all barriers to the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital. Mutual 
recognition achieves this objective, but it does not 
satisfy all aspirations of consumers and producers ... only 
harmonization can implement effective Community policies 




























































































Community a leading role in the fields of public health, 
technical security and consumer protection" (ib.:97).
The realization that mutual recognition did not 
signify the end, or even a significant limitation, of EC 
regulation may have led to Mrs.Thatcher's notorious Bruges 
speech in 1988. At any rate, the strategy actually followed 
by the Commission is a blend of several elements: an 
attempt to draw a clearer distinction between what is 
essential to harmonize and what may be left to mutual 
recognition of national regulations; legislative 
harmonization of national rules to be restricted to laying 
down essential health and safety requirements which will be 
obligatory in all member states; gradual replacement of 
national product specifications by European standards 
issued by the Comité Européen de la Normalisation (CEN) or 
by sectoral European organizations.
An excellent example of this original mix of 
deregulation (mutual recognition) and re-regulation (EC- 
wide harmonization of essential supervisory rules) is the 
Second Banking Directive (89/646/EEC) which becomes 
effective on January 1, 1993. The essential elements of 
this directive are the concept of a single banking license 
and the list of permissible banking activities. This list 
is very broad and includes activities, such as dealing in 
and underwriting securities, which American banks, for 
example, are prevented from entering into by the Glass- 
Steagall Act. Within the regulatory framework provided by 
the Second Banking Directive and by other more narrow 
directives harmonizing such things as the definition of own 
funds (capital) and solvency ratios, a European bank will 
need a single license from its home country to be allowed 
to establish branches or directly market financial services 
in any other EC country. With few exceptions, the host 
country has no power to seek further authorizations or 
exercise supervision. This is, of course, a direct 




























































































What we have here, as in most other directives 
inspired by the new strategy, is deregulation at the 
national level combined with re-regulation at EC level. The 
apparently paradoxical combination of deregulation and re­
regulation is what is meant by "regulatory reform". In this 
sense, the essence of the new strategy is neither 
deregulation nor even re-regulation but, more precisely, 
regulatory reform. In order to appreciate the real 
significance of the new regulatory philosophy introduced by 
the White Paper and the SEA, however, it is not enough to 
examine specific applications. One must also understand the 
key role played by regulation in the general system of 
Community policy making.
4. The European Community as regulator
It is becoming increasingly difficult to understand the 
domestic policies of member states without taking Community 
legislation into consideration. This is particularly true 
for economic and social regulation. I do not mean to 
suggest that EC regulators attempt to replace or even 
closely supervise national regulators. Such a goal would be 
politically infeasible at present, and would in any case 
require a large increase of specialist staffs in Brussels 
and the creation of European regulatory agencies and 
inspectorates.
Comparing national and Community rule making in a 
number of policy fields one can see instead two different 
regulatory systems, with the second designed to coordinate 
and complement rather than replace or challenge the first. 
At the same time, one must keep in mind that Community 
regulation, when agreed by the Council, has primacy over 
national legislation. Hence, regardless of the intentions 
of the Commission, national regulators tend to lose power 
in an increasing number of areas (Vipod, 1989).
Political scientists have paid insufficient attention 
to these developments. The vast literature on European 




























































































contains very few studies of the political economy of 
regulation at the Community level. Given the importance of 
Community regulation in so many areas of economic and 
social life, from banking and technical standardization to 
environmental protection and health and safety at work, 
this scarcity of studies of EC regulatory policy making is 
surprising and can only be explained by the absence of a 
suitable theoretical framework.
As every student of the US political economy knows, in 
American regulation is a distinct type of policy making 
that has spawned a specialized theoretical and empirical 
literature; indeed, in political science and economics the 
study of regulation has been elevated to the rank of a 
subdiscipline. The situation is different in Europe. Here, 
despite the intensity of the debate about deregulation at 
the national and Community levels, research on the 
political economy of regulation is still a relatively new 
area of scholarship. Paradoxically, the study of 
deregulation has preceded the theory, if not the practice, 
of regulation.
There are several reasons why European social 
scientists have not developed anything comparable to the 
American theories of regulation. To begin with, the term 
itself is often used differently on the two sides of the 
Atlantic. In Europe there is a tendency to identify 
regulation with the whole realm of legislation, macro 
governance of the economy and social control. This broad 
use of the term makes the study of regulation coextensive 
with law, economics, political science, and sociology, and 
thus impedes the development of a theory of regulation as a 
distinct kind of policy making.
By contrast, within the framework of American public 
policy and administration, regulation has acquired a more 
specific meaning. It refers to "sustained and focused 
control exercised by a public agency over activities that
1985:363). This definition has the advantage of making




























































































explicit the two distinguishing features of American-style 
regulation- The reference to socially desirable activities 
excludes, for example, most of what goes on in the criminal 
justice system. At the same time, it suggests that market 
activities are "regulated" only in societies that consider 
such activities worthwhile in themselves and hence in need 
of protection as well as control. It follows that public 
regulation of markets is justified only by the existence of 
specific forms of "market failure”: monopoly power, 
insufficient information, inadequate provision of public 
goods, or negative externalities such as environmental 
pollution.
The second characteristic —  sustained and focused 
control by a public agency —  implies that regulation is 
not achieved simply by passing a law, but requires detailed 
knowledge of, and intimate involvement with, the regulated 
activity. Hence the adoption of a regulatory mode of policy 
making implies the creation, sooner or later, of 
specialized agencies or commissions capable of fact 
finding, rule making, and enforcement. This tendency 
explains the recent growth of "regulatory offices" in Great 
Britain and "autorités administratives indépendantes" in 
France, and also various proposals of the EC Commission for 
the creation of specialized agencies in the areas of 
environment, health and safety at work, and testing of new 
medical drugs.
The fact that American-style regulation is becoming 
increasingly popular also in Europe is a direct consequence 
of the ideological, economic and technological changes of 
the past fifteen years. The long tradition of regulation in 
the United States —  which at the federal level goes back 
to the 1887'Interstate Commerce Act regulating the 
railroads —  expresses a widely held belief that the market 
works well under normal circumstances, and should be 
interfered with only in specific cases of market failure.
In Europe, popular acceptance of the market ideology is a 




























































































great deflation of 1873-96 and the end of World War II, 
large segments of public opinion were openly hostile to the 
market economy, and skeptical about the capacity of the 
system to survive its recurrent crises. Hence in industry 
after industry the typical response of European governments 
to perceived cases of market failure was not regulation but 
nationalization, industrial reorganization, planning, or 
various forms of corporatist governance.
However, the limitations of traditional forms of state 
intervention became increasingly obvious in the post-war 
period, leading to the belief that the proper role of the 
state in the economic game is not that of a player, but of 
the rule-setter and umpire. At the same time, the growing 
interdependence of the world economy was making purely 
national regulations more or less irrelevant for a large 
number of policy areas. In retrospect, the need for EC-wide 
regulations seems obvious, but because of the conceptual, 
ideological and historical factors noted above, the 
implications have remained unnoticed for a long time, at 
least by political scientists.
Aside from competition policy and deregulatory 
measures necessary to the integration of national markets, 
few regulatory policies or programmes are specifically 
mentioned in the Treaty of Rome. Transport and energy 
policies which could have given rise to significant 
regulatory activities, have remained largely undeveloped.
On the other hand, agricultural, regional and social 
policies which, together with development aid, absorb about 
80 per cent of the Community budget, are mostly 
distributive rather than regulatory in nature.
How, then, can one explain the continuous growth of 
Community regulation, even in the absence of explicit legal 
mandates? Take the case of environmental protection, an 
area not even mentioned by the Treaty of Rome. In the two 
decades from 1967 to 1987, when the Single European Act 
finally recognized the authority of the Community to 




























































































and decisions were introduced by the Commission. Moreover, 
the rate of growth of environmental regulation appears to 
have been largely unaffected by the political vicissitudes, 
budgetary crises, and recurrent waves of Europessimism of 
the 1970s and early 1980s. From the single directive on 
preventing risks by testing of 1969 (L68/19.3.69) we pass 
to 10 directives/decisions in 1975, 13 in 1980, 20 in 1982, 
23 in 1984, 24 in 1985 and 17 in the six months immediately 
preceding passage of the Single European Act.
The case of environmental regulation is particularly 
striking, partly because of the political salience of 
environmental issues, but it is by no means unique. The 
volume and depth of Community regulation in the areas of 
consumer product safety, medical drug testing, banking and 
financial services and, of course, competition law is 
hardly less impressive. In fact, the hundreds of regulatory 
measures proposed by the Commission's White Paper only 
represent the acceleration of a trend set in motion decades 
ago. The continuous growth of supranational regulation is 
not easily explained by traditional theories of Community 
policy making. At most, such theories suggest that the 
serious implementation gap that exists in the European 
Community may make it easier for the member states, and 
their representatives in the Council, to accept Commission 
proposals which they have no serious intention of applying. 
The main limitation of this argument is that it fails to 
differentiate between areas where policy development has 
been slow and uncertain (for example, transport, energy or 
research) and areas where significant policy development 
has taken place even in the absence of a clear legal basis.
Moreover, existing theories of Community policy making 
do not usually draw any clear distinction between 
regulatory and other types of policies. Now, an important 
characteristic of regulatory policy making is the limited 
influence of budgetary limitations on the activities of 




























































































programmes is constrained by budgetary appropriations and, 
ultimately, by the size of government tax revenues. In 
contrast, the real costs of most regulatory programmes are 
borne directly by the firms and individuals who have to 
comply with them. Compared with these costs, the resources 
needed to produce the regulations are trivial.
It is difficult to overstate the significance of this 
structural difference between regulatory policies and 
policies involving the direct expenditure of public funds. 
The distinction is particularly important for the analysis 
of Community policy making, since not only the economic, 
but also the political and administrative costs of 
enforcing EC regulations are borne by the member states.
As already noted, the financial resources of the 
Community go, for the most part, to the Common Agricultural 
Policy and to a handful of redistributive programmes. The 
remaining resources are insufficient tc support large scale 
initiatives in areas like industrial policy, energy, 
research, or technological innovation. Given this 
constraint, the only way for the Commission to increase its 
role was to expand the scope of its regulatory activities.
Thus any satisfactory explanation of the remarkable 
growth of Community regulation must take into account both 
the desire of the Commission to increase its influence —  a 
fairly uncontroversial behavioural assumption —  and the 
possibility of escaping budgetary constraints by resorting 
to regulatory policy making. But this is only part of the 
explanation. Another important element is the interest of 
multi-national, export-oriented industries in avoiding 
inconsistent and progressively more stringent regulations 
in various EC and non-EC countries. Community regulation 
can eliminate or at least reduce this risk.
A similar phenomenon has been observed in the United 
States, where certain industries, faced with the danger of 
a significant loss of markets through state and local 
legislation, have strongly supported federal regulation 




























































































industry, which during the early 1960s had successfully 
opposed federal emission standards for motor vehicles, 
abruptly reversed its position in mid-1965: provided that 
the federal standards would be set by a regulatory agency, 
and provided that they wou]d preempt any state standards 
more stringent than California's, the industry would 
support federal legislation.
Analogous reasons explain the preference for Community 
solutions of some powerful and well-organized European 
industries. Consider, for example, the "Sixth Amendment" of 
Directive 67/548 on the classification, packaging, and 
labelling of dangerous substances. This amending Directive 
79/831 does not prevent member states from including more 
substances within the scope of national regulations than 
are required by the Directive itself. In fact, the British 
Health and Safety Commission proposed to go further than 
the Directive by bringing intermediate products within the 
scope of national regulation. This, however, was opposed by 
the chemical industry, represented by the Chemical 
Industries Association (CIA) which argued that national 
regulation should not impose greater burdens on British 
industry than the Directive placed on its competitors. The 
CIA view eventually prevailed.
Similarly, German negotiators pressed for a European­
wide scheme that would also provide the framework for an 
acceptable regulatory programme at home, wanted a full and 
explicit statement of their obligations to be defined at 
the EC level. Moreover, with more than 50 per cent of 
Germany's chemical trade going to other EC countries,
German businessmen and government officials wished to avoid 
the commercial obstacles that would arise from divergent 
national regulations (Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilsen, 1985).
The European chemical industry had another reason for 
supporting Community regulation. In 1976 the United States, 
without consulting their commercial partners, enacted the 
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). The new regulation 




























































































lucrative American market. A European response to TSCA was 
clearly needed, and the Community was the logical forum for 
fashioning such a response. An EC-wide system of testing 
new chemical substances could serve as a model for 
negotiating standardized requirements covering the major 
chemical markets. In fact, the 1979 Directive has enable 
the Community to speak with one voice in discussions with 
the United States and other OECD countries, and has 
strengthened the position of the European chemical industry 
in ensuring that the new American regulation does not 
create obstacles to its exports. There is little doubt that 
the ability of the Commission to enter into discussions 
with the USA has been greatly enhanced by the Directive, 
and it is unlikely that each European country on its own 
could do so effectively (ib.:277).
5. The "deepening" of Community regulation 
Even more impressive than its quantitative growth, and 
certainly more difficult to explain in traditional terms, 
is the increasing strictness or "deepening" of EC 
regulation. The SEA provided for the first time an explicit 
legal basis for environmental protection, and established 
the principle that environmental protection requirements 
shall be a component of the Community's other policies 
(Art.130 r(2), EEC). It also introduced the principle of 
qualified majority voting for occupational health and 
safety, and the notion of "working environment" which opens 
up the possibility of regulatory interventions in areas 
such as ergonomics which traditionally have been outside 
the field of health and safety at work. Finally, Art.100 
a(3) urges the Commission to take a high level of 
protection as a base in its proposals relating to health, 
safety, environmental protection and consumer protection.
The Treaty of Maastricht, if ratified, will continue 
this development by establishing consumer protection as a 
Community policy, defining a role for the Community in 




























































































and introducing qualified majority voting for most 
environmental legislation.
The qualitative deepening of EC regulation is revealed 
by several indicators (Majone, forthcoming), of which only 
two will be mentioned here. First, measures concerning 
health, safety and environmental and consumer protection no 
longer have to be justified by the goal of eliminating 
obstacles to trade and distortions of competition. Prior to 
the SEA, articles 100 and 235 of the Rome Treaty did indeed 
limit regulatory policy making to problems with a 
substantial economic impact. However, as Rehbinder and 
Stewart (1385) have pointed out, even before the SEA the 
thesis of the exclusive economic motivation of, for 
example, EC environmental law, was wrong because it ignored 
the fact that environmental priorities are set by the 
Community environmental programmes; and these are not based 
on narrow economic obj ectives, but seek to promote 
environmental quality as an important goal in its own 
right.
The second important indicator of "deepening" is the 
innovative character of some recent regulatory decisions.
It used to be said that EC regulations, in order to be 
accepted by the member states, had to represent a kind of 
lowest common-denominator solution. The fact that national 
interests are strongly represented at each stage of 
Community policy making seemed to preclude the possibility 
of innovation, while giving a bargaining advantage to those 
member states which oppose high levels of protection. Hence 
the fear of "social dumping" often expressed by countries 
with advanced social legislation. According to the 
conventional wisdom, the Community could at best hope "to 
generalize and diffuse solutions adopted in one or more 
Member States by introducing them throughout the Community. 
The solutions of these Member States normally set the 





























































































Even in the past this assessment was not quite correct 
(Majone, forthcoming). However, the most striking examples 
of regulatory innovation were made possible by the SEA, in 
particular by the introduction of qualified majority not 
only for internal market legislation but also for an 
important area of social regulation like health and safety 
at work. Thus, Directive 89/391 "on the introduction of 
measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health 
of workers", goes beyond the regulatory philosophy and 
practice even of advanced member states like Germany 
(Feldhoff, 1992). Among the notable features of this 
directive are its scope (it applies to all sectors of 
activity, both public and private, including service, 
educational, cultural and leisure activities); the 
requirements concerning worker information; the emphasis on 
participation and training of workers ; and the very broad 
obligations imposed on employers (see Table 2).
Insert Table 2 here
Equally innovative are the Machinery Directive 89/392 and, 
in a more limited sphere, Directive 90/270 on health and 
safety for work with display screen equipment. Both 
directives rely on the concept of "working environment", 
and consider psychological factors like stress and fatigue 
important elements to be considered in a modern regulatory 
approach. For example, Annex I of the Machinery Directive 
states, inter alia, that "under the intended conditions of 
'use, the discomfort, fatigue and psychological stress faced 
by the operator must be reduced to the minimum possible 
taking ergonomic principles into account". It is difficult 
to find equally advanced principles in the legislation of 
any major industrialized country, inside or outside the EC.
Such results cannot be explained merely by considering 
the legal powers of the Commission. Under the Treaty of 
Rome, the Commission is conceived of as the embodiment of 




























































































represent the point of view of the member states. However 
the practice of Community policy making has not always 
respected the equilibrium between supranational and 
national interests sought by the founders. In fact, the 
interests of the member states, and of the various economic 
and social groups within them, do not find expression only 
in the deliberations of the Council of Ministers. Although 
the Commission has an almost exclusive power to initiate 
legislation, its staff invariably formulates proposals only 
after extensive consultations with technical and 
bureaucratic experts from the member states. This early 
process of consultation is generally coordinated by the 
permanent national delegations. Once the Commission is 
considering proposals, comments and reservations of the 
national experts are subject to negotiations both 
informally and in the context of formal proceedings. The 
process is repeated at the level of the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (COREPER) before going to the 
Council. Thus at least two complete cycles of consultation 
with national experts and representatives of interest 
groups take place before a Commission proposal goes to the 
Council.
Even more striking than the role of national experts 
in Community policy making is the almost complete 
dependence upon national authorities for implementation of 
Community rules. With a few exceptions such'as the 
agricultural and competition policies, fact finding and 
enforcement are entrusted to the national administrations 
or to the courts of the member states. With a staff of only 
about 11500 people, of whom more than 1500 are interpreters 
and translators, the Commission is obviously not in a 
position to monitor the implementation of all the policies 
which it helps to initiate. Moreover, its small budget is 
insufficient to provide financial incentives for a better 
implementation of those policies by the member states.
For all these reasons many authors have argued that 




























































































dominated by the member states in all stages of the 
process: political initiative comes from the heads of state 
or governments (European Council); technical elaboration is 
provided by the national experts; political mediation takes 
place in the framework of COREPER; formal adoption is the 
prerogative of the Council of Ministers; implementation is 
in the hands of the national administrations (Krislov et 
al., 1986).
Formally, this picture is correct; substantively, it 
does not explain, for example, the leading role of the 
Commission in the preparation of the internal market 
programme, nor the results achieved in the field of health 
and safety at work and in other areas of social regulation 
not discussed in this paper (Majone, forthcoming). In an 
increasing number of instances, the Commission, usually 
with the support of the European Parliament, appears to be 
able to introduce significant innovations with respect to 
the policies cf most or all member•states. The model of a 
policy making system dominated by the interests of the most 
important member states clearly needs substantial 
revisions. Thus, the Machinery Directive was inspired by 
the regulatory philosophy of two small countries —  the 
Netherlands and Denmark who first introduced the concept of 
"working environment" into their legislations —  and 
opposed by Germany in an attempt to preserve the power of 
its own regulatory bodies (Feldhoff, 1992; Eichener, 
forthcoming).
6. Toward a more accurate model of EC policy making 
A revised model of regulatory policy making in the 
Community must include two elements that have been largely 
overlooked by the received theories: first, the 
characteristic problems of "regulatory failure" which arise 
in an international context, limiting the usefulness of 
inter-governmental (rather than supranational) solutions; 




























































































mode of policy making and, as such, requires a high degree 
of technical and administrative discretion.
If national regulators were willing and able to take 
into account the international repercussions of their 
choices; if they had perfect information of one another's 
intentions; and if the costs of organising and monitoring 
policy coordination were negligible, market failures with 
transboundary impacts could be managed in a cooperative 
fashion without the necessity of delegating powers to a 
supranational level. In fact, it is quite difficult to 
verify whether or not inter-governmental agreements are 
being properly kept. Because regulators lack information 
that only regulated firms have, and because governments are 
reluctant, for political reasons, to impose excessive costs 
on industry, bargaining is an essential feature of the 
process of regulatory enforcement. Regardless of what the 
law says, the process of regulation is not simply one where 
the regulators command and the regulated obey. A "market" 
is created in which bureaucrats and those subject to 
regulation bargain over the precise obligations of the 
latter (Peacock, 1984). Because bargaining is so pervasive, 
it may be- impossible for an outside observer to determine 
whether or not an international regulation has been, in 
fact, violated.
When it is difficult to observe whether governments 
are making an honest effort to enforce a cooperative 
agreement, the agreement is not credible. For example, 
where pollution has international effects and fines impose 
significant competitive disadvantages on firms that compete 
internationally, firms are likely to believe that national 
regulators will be unwilling to prosecute them as 
rigorously if they determine the level of enforcement 
unilaterally rather than under supranational supervision. 
Hence the transfer of regulatory powers to a supranational 
authority like the EC Commission, by making more stringent 
regulation credible, may improve the behaviour of regulated 




























































































regulation of a large number of firms throughout the' 
Community, it has much more to gain by being tough in any 
individual case than a national regulator: weak enforcement 
would destroy its credibility in the eyes of more firms. 
Thus it may be more willing to enforce sanctions than a 
member state would be (Gatsios and Seabright, 1989). In 
fact, the Commission has consistently taken a stricter pro­
competition stance than national authorities like the 
British Monopolies and Mergers Commission, the German 
Bundeskartellamt, or the French Conseil de la Concurrence.
In short, the low credibility of inter-governmental 
agreements explains the willingness of member states to 
delegate regulatory powers to a supranational authority. At 
the same time, however, governments attempt to limit the 
discretion of the Commission by making it dependent on the 
information and knowledge provided by national bureaucrats 
and experts. We must now explain how the Commission often 
manages to overcome these limitations.
The offices of the Commission responsible for a 
particular policy area form the central node in a vast 
"issue network" that includes not only experts from the 
national administrations, but independent experts (also 
from non-EC countries), academics, public-interest 
advocates like environmentalists and leaders of consumer 
movements, representatives of economic and professional 
organizations and of regional bodies. Commission officials 
listen to everybody —  both in advisory committees, which 
they normally chair, and in informal consultations —  but 
are free to choose whose ideas and proposals to adopt. They 
operate less as technical experts alongside other technical 
experts, than as policy entrepreneurs, that is, as 
"advocates who are willing to invest their resources —  
time, energy, reputation, money —  to promote a position in 
return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, 
purposive, or solidary benefits" (Kingdon, 1984: 188).
In his study of policy innovation in America, Kingdon 




























































































entrepreneurs: first, the person must have some claim to be 
taken seriously, either as an expert, as a leader of a 
powerful interest group, or as an authoritative decision 
maker; second, the person must be known for his political 
connections or negotiating skills; third, and probably most 
important, successful entrepreneurs are persistent (ib.: 
189-90). Because of the way they are recruited, the 
structure of their career incentives, and the crucial role 
of the Commission in policy initiation, Commission 
officials usually display the qualities of a successful 
policy entrepreneur to a degree unmatched by national civil 
servants. Actually,
the Commission officials1 typical 
motivational structure is quite 
different from that of the average 
national government official. While the 
staff of the national governments is 
often recruited from persons who tend 
to be —  compared with their peers who 
choose an industrial career —  solid, 
correct, security-oriented, 
conservative, risk-averse and often 
somewhat narrow-minded, the Commission 
recruits its staff from people who are 
highly motivated, risk oriented, 
polyglot, cosmopolitan, open-minded and 
innovative... From the beginnings in 
the 1960s and up to the present, it has 
indeed been officials of a special type 
who chose to leave the relative 
security of their national 
administrations to go to Brussels to do 
there a well-paid but extremely 
challenging job ... The structural 
conditions of recruitment and career 
favour a tendency to support new ideas 
and to pursue a strategy of innovative 
regulation which attempts to go beyond 
everything which can presently be found 
in the Member States (Eichener, 
forthcoming: 51-52).
Because of this tendency to favour innovative regulatory 
solutions, even national experts may find the Community a 
more receptive forum for their ideas than their own 
administrations. The Machinery Directive offers a striking 




























































































technical annex of the directive was drafted by a British 
labour inspector who originally sought to reform the 
British regulatory approach. Having failed to persuade the 
policy makers of his own country, he brought his innovative 
ideas about risk assessment to Brussels, where they were 
welcomed by Commission officials and eventually became 
European law (ib.:52).
Moreover, what is known about the modus ooerandi of 
the advisory committees suggests that debates there follow 
substantive rather than national lines. A good deal of 
copinaae technocratiaue develops between Commission 
officials and national experts interested in discovering 
pragmatic solutions rather than defending political 
positions. By the time a Commission proposal reaches the 
political level, first in COREPER and then in the Council 
of Ministers, all the technical details have been worked 
out and modifications usually leave the essentials 
untouched. The Council may of course delay a decision or 
reject the proposal outright, but these options are 
becoming increasingly problematic under the qualified 
majority rule and the "cooperation procedure" between the 
European Parliament and the Council introduced by the SEA. 
However, these institutional innovations are not by 
themselves sufficient to explain the relative autonomy of 
the Commission in regulatory matters. Two key 
characteristics of this mode of policy making must also be 
considered: regulation does not impose direct fiscal 
burdens on the national governments and thus does not 
generate as much controversy as fiscal issues in which 
winners and losers are more visible (Peters, 1992); on the 
other hand, drafting regulations requires expertise, and 
reliance on expertise entails granting the necessary 
administrative and technical discretion.
7. Conclusion: the changing role of the state
The nation states of Western Europe are being transformed




























































































and ideology, but also by the steady, if uneven, progress 
of supranational integration. Although a new equilibrium 
configuration has yet to emerge, some of its main features 
are at least dimly visible.
In the economic sphere, the regulatory state is slowly 
replacing the entrepreneurial and dirigiste state of the 
past. Public policy no longer attempts to replace the 
market but rather tries to support it, while correcting its 
major failures. Even in countries where the presence of the 
state in the economy remains significant, governments begin 
to realize that operating a public service and regulating 
it are not only different, but also conflicting functions 
and hence should be institutionally separated. At the same 
time, the widespread skepticism in the ability of the state 
to act as entrepreneur, planner, employer of last resort 
and provider of services which the market could provide 
more efficiently, has not led to demands for a return to 
laissez faire, as the more radical advocates of 
privatisation and deregulation seemed to expect. In Europe, 
as in America, privatised and deregulated industries must 
still cope with antitrust laws, and with a host of ever 
stricter regulations to protect the environment, the 
interests of consumers, and the health and safety of 
workers. Rather than a return to laissez faire, voters seem 
to demand more focused and efficient public interventions, 
and better protection of diffused interests which the 
corporatist policies of the past neglected.
In the social sphere, traditional cleavages along 
class, party or religious lines are becoming less 
significant than new "transversal" divisions over cultural 
or regional diversity, citizen rights, the environment, the 
risks of modern technology, and other quality-of-life 
issues. The new priorities will eventually force 
governments to rethink the role of social policy in post­
industrial societies. The European welfare state is the 




























































































policies reflect the values of societies where the central 
issue was the distribution of the domestic product.
The question to be faced now is whether traditional 
welfare policies based on the universal provision of social 
services and large-scale transfer payments, are compatible 
with a serious commitment to the new priorities. Budgetary 
limitations are one obvious source of potential tensions: 
current estimates of the costs of various environmental 
programmes show that these represent a significant and 
growing percentage of GNP in all OECD countries. Sooner or 
later, therefore, voters have to face the choice between 
expanding or even continuing welfare programmes, and 
devoting sufficient resources to environmental protection 
and other types of social regulation. As shown by the 
example of the United States (a "welfare laggard" by 
European standards, but a pioneer in social regulation), 
social regulation is politically less controversial than 
welfare policies in countries where the ideology of free 
markets and consumer sovereignty receives widespread 
support. If this is true, also in Europe social 
regulation —  environmental and consumer protection, risk 
management, gender issues, health and safety at work —  may 
replace traditional welfare policies in the ranking of 
political priorities.
Finally, some of the institutional developments now 
taking place in Europe are hardly less far-reaching, even 
if less apparent, than the changes in economic and social 
priorities. Among the most significant trends are the 
continuing movement toward régionalisation or 
fédéralisation even in traditionally centralised countries 
like France, the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy; the 
replacement of corporatist by pluralist (or, in some cases, 
technocratic) arrangements for policymaking; the birth of 
judicial politics and policymaking in France (Stone, 1992) 





























































































This last development may appear to have only 
technical significance, but in reality is quite revealing 
of the changing nature of state-society relations. 
Independent agencies or commissions combining legislative, 
executive and judicial functions are foreign to the legal 
and administrative traditions of most European countries.
As several scholars have pointed out, the creation of 
bodies characterized by their independence from the central 
administrations, by their technocratic expertise and, 
usually, by the collegiality of their decisions —  as an 
additional guarantee of independence and objectivity —  is 
a clear indication of the loss of legitimacy of the 
traditional channels of political power, and also of the 
inadequacy of the existing administrative structures to 
meet the new demands of economy and society (Guedon, 1991; 
Vesperini, 1990; Colliard and Timsit, 1988; Baldwin and 
McCrudden, 1987).
Directly or indirectly, the European Community is 
involved in all these transformations. To begin with the 
relations between state and market, it should be noted that 
the Treaty of Rome entails a certain amount of economic 
deregulation. A single European market cannot come into 
being and operate effectively without limiting the capacity 
of national governments to intervene in the economy for 
anticompetitive or protectionist goals. For example, under 
article 90 of the treaty, member states are obliged to open 
to competition markets previously reserved to their public 
enterprises or monopolies. In this respect, Community law 
has accelerated the trend toward privatisation and 
deregulation.
On the other hand, European voters are willing neither 
to accept a complete reversal of the principles of a "mixed 
economy", nor to transfer to Community institutions the 
powers necessary to carry out all the traditional functions 
of government. To resolve this dilemma, it will be 
necessary to find a compromise between these conflicting 




























































































out, the regulation issue —  what, how, and at what level 
of government to regulate —  is the core of the emergent 
compromise (Pelkmans, 1989).
Not surprisingly, the social domain poses the greatest 
conceptual and political difficulties. This is because each 
society has found a different solution to the basic trade­
off between economic efficiency and a more equal 
distribution of income and wealth. If it is true that the 
delicate value judgements about the appropriate balance of 
equity and efficiency which social policies express, can 
only be made legitimately within homogeneous communities, 
it follows that decision about income redistribution or the 
provision of "merit goods" should be taken at national or 
even subnational levels. This does not mean that the 
Community cannot have a "social dimension", at least if in 
this expression we include also those quality-of-life 
issues that form the object of social regulation.
In fact, for many years the Community has been 
addressing issues like consumer protection and equal 
treatment for men and women which national policies 
historically neglected. Even in areas of social regulation 
where national governments have been active for a long 
time, like product safety or health and safety at work, the 
EC has been able to achieve significant policy innovations.
To sum up, the progress of European integration will 
lead neither to a supranational welfare state nor to 
laissez faire or to the much feared phenomenon of "social 
dumping". Rather, redistributive and other traditional 
social policies will remain under the control of national 
governments —  subject to the constraints imposed by a 
European market where labour, capital, services and people 
are free to move —  while the Community will continue to 
play a leading role in economic and social regulation. As 
noted above, Community policies are designed to coordinate 
and complement rather than replace or challenge national 




























































































an increasing number of fields, the capacity to innovate is 
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Any rules liable to hinder directly or indirectly, 
immediately or in the future, intercommunity trade 
constitute a violation of the rules of Articles 30 et seq. 
of the EEC Treaty.
Any product legally manufactured and sold in a Member State 
must in principle be admitted to the market of any other 
Member State.
European Court of Justice: Judgement of 20 
February 1979 in case No.120/78 ("Cassis de 
Dijon").
An approach based on the guidelines described [reference to 
the Cassis de Dijon judgement] would make it possible 
henceforth to put a stop to the application of a large 
number of national regulations insofar as these hinder 
trade between the Member States ... The removal of 
technical barriers to trade is one of the requirements for 
the establishment of the Community's internal market ...
The Commission must therefore review the whole of its 
activities in connection with the removal of barriers to 
trade in the lights of the policies it intends to pursue. 
Commission of the European Communities: Removal 
of Technical Barriers to Trade (Communication to 
the European Parliament of 24 January 1980),
C0M(80) 30 final.
Under the pressure of the economic crisis during the two 
recessions of the past seven years Member States have not 
completely withstood the temptation to yield to national 
protectionism. Among the measure which give rise to alarm 
... are non-tariff and administrative barriers of all types 
—  in particular in the field of technical specifications 
and standards —  the tax limits, the constant overbidding 
in granting direct and indirect subsidies, the gaps in 
foreign trade policy —  and the increasing influence of 
Member States on procurement and on the general functioning 
of the market.
Commission of the European Communities: The State 
of the Internal Market (Communication to the 
Council of 17 June 1981) (COM(81)313 final).
The European Council echoed the alarm sounded by the 
Commission on the state of the internal market, which is 
increasingly threatened by intentional and unintentional 
barriers to trade and by the pervasive use of subsidies to 
ailing industries. The European Council agreed that a 
concerted effort must be made to strengthen and develop the 
free internal market for goods and services which lies at 




























































































platform from which it conducts its common commercial 
policy.
Declaration of the European Council at its 
meeting of 29 and 30 June 1981, Bull.EC 6-1981, 
point 1.1.6.
Decision-making would be facilitated if a return were made 
to the following basic principles:
(a) European integration cannot succeed unless it is 
accepted that traditional systems of administration 
and supervision must be adapted to meet new situations 
and requirements;
(b) a common market cannot be viable without confidence in 
the common institutions ;
(c) the Community must be able to make its presence felt 
in the field of technical barriers too.
Commission of the European Communities: Re­
activating the European Internal Market 
(Communication to the Council of 15 November
1982) COM(82)735 final.
When new [national] acts or regulations are deemed 
necessary, it has not become the habit to draft instruments 
which create least difficulty as regards relations with the 
Community ... A more serious matter is the attitude of 
technical experts ... who "stand pat" on their arguments 
because they regard their country's way of doing things as 
so good that it cannot be altered for the sake of reaching 
a Community solution. The Commission has often found that 
such resistance can more easily be overcome when it is 
inspired by specific interests which can be evaluated and 
compensated in some way, than when it is merely a dogmatic 
reaction.
Commission of the European Communities:
Assessment of the Function of the Internal Market 
(Report to the Council of 24 February 1983)
C0M(83)80 final.
Restoring confidence in the future of the internal market 
means above all restoring public confidence in the 
irreversibility of Community integration.
This decisive breakthrough will require neither new 
policies nor new budgetary resources. But what is needed is 
the adoption of a limited number of proposals that are 
already before the Council, the beneficial effects of which 
will far outweigh the adjustment efforts intrinsically 
associated with this dynamic venture.
Commission of the European Communities:
Consolidating the Internal Market (Communication 
to the Council of 13 June 1984) COM(84)305 final.
Le Parlement européen
... impute la responsabilité de l'interruption de 
l'unification des marchés nationaux en un marché 
communautaire à l'absence de volonté politique, au manque 




























































































gouvernements des Etats membres représentés au Conseil des 
Communautés européennes mais aussi aux carences du Conseil 
européen, ainsi qu'à la procédure de décision au sein des 
instances communautaires ... invite par conséquent le 
Conseil à adopter sans délai les propositions concernant la 
réalisation du marché intérieur, approuvées par le 
Parlement dont certaines lui ont été présentées voici de 
nombreuses années...
Parlement Européen: Rapport sur la Nécessité de 
Réaliser le Marché Intérieur Européen du 26 mars 
1984 (rapporteurs: MM J.Moreau et K.von Wogan)
Doc.1-32/84.
Given the European Council's clear and repeated commitment 
to the completion of the common market, the Commission does 
not intend in this Paper to rehearse again the economic and 
political arguments that have so often led to that 
conclusion. Instead the Commission ... sets out here the 
essential and logical consequences of accepting that 
commitment, together with an action programme for achieving 
the objective.
Commission of the European Communities:
Completing the Internal Market (White Paper from 































































































of 12 June 1989
on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements 
in the safety and health of workers at work (89/391/EEC)
Article 6
General obligations on employers
1. Within the context of his responsibilities, the employer 
shall take the measures necessary for the safety and health 
protection of workers, including preventions of 
occupational risks and provision of information and 
training, as well as provision of the necessary 
organizations and means.
The employer shall be alert to the need to adjust these 
measures to take account of changing circumstances and aim 
to improve existing situations.
2. The employer shall implement the measures referred to in 
the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 on the basis of the 
following general principles of prevention:
(a) avoiding risks;
(b) evaluating the risks which cannot be avoided;
(c ) combating the risks at source ;
(d) adapting the work to the individual, especially as 
regards the design of work places, the choice of work 
equipment and the choice of working and production 
methods, with a view, in particular, to alleviating 
monotonous work and work at a predetermined work-rate 
and to reducing their effect on health.
(e) adapting to technical progress;
(f) replacing the dangerous by the non-dangerous or the 
less dangerous ;
(g) developing a coherent overall prevention policy which 
covers technology, organizations of work, working 
conditions, social relationships and the influence of 
factors related to the working environment;
(h) giving collective protective measures priority over 
individual protective measures;




























































































3. Without prejudice to the other provisions of this 
Directive, the employer shall, taking into account the 
nature of the activities of the enterprise and/or 
establishment:
(a) evaluate the risks to the safety and health of 
workers, inter alia in the choice of work equipment, 
the chemical substances or preparations* used, and the 
fitting-out of work places.
Subsequent to this evaluation and as necessary, the 
preventive measures and the working and production 
methods implemented by the employer must:
- assure an improvement in the level of protection 
afforded to workers with regard to safety and health,
- be integrated into all the activities of the 
undertaking and/or establishment and at all 
hierarchical levels;
(b) where he entrusts tasks to a worker, take into 
consideration the worker's capabilities as regards 
health and safety;
(c) ensure that the planning and introduction of new 
technologies are the subject of consultation with the 
workers and/or their representatives, as regards the 
consequences of the choice of equipment, the working 
conditions and the working environment for the safety 
and health of workers;
(d) take appropriate steps to ensure that only workers who 
have received adequate instructions may have access tc 
areas where there is serious and specific danger.
4. Without prejudice to the other provisions of this 
Directive, where several undertakings share a work place, 
the employers shall cooperate in implementing the safety, 
health and occupational hygiene provisions and, taking into 
account the nature of the activities, shall coordinate 
their actions in matters of the protection and prevention 
of occupational risks, and shall inform one another and 
their respective workers and/or worker's representatives of 
these risks.
5. Measures related to safety, hygiene and health at work 
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